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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially hon-
est agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural
price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies
with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically rational agents and
partially honest agents coexist. Firstly, assuming that there exists at least one
partially honest agent in either the weak notion or the strong notion, the class
of e¢ cient social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable by such
mechanisms is characterized. Secondly, the (unconstrained) Walrasian correspon-
dence is shown to be implementable by such a mechanism when there is at least
one partially honest agent of the strong type, which may provide a behavioral foun-
dation for decentralized implementation of the Walrasian equilibrium. Finally, in
this set-up, the e¤ects of honesty on the implementation of more equitable Pareto
optimal allocations can be viewed as negligible.
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The usual caveat applies.
1 Introduction
A goal of implementation theory is to characterize the class of social choice corre-
spondences (SCC s) which could be implemented via some decentralized decision
making processes, given various information structures. Maskin (1999) provides
a general framework of implementation theory and, given the complete informa-
tion structure and the (Nash) equilibrium solution concept, discusses a necessary
condition and a su¢ cient condition for (Nash) implementation.1 This canonical
theory of implementation, however, rests on two basic assumptions: 1) There is no
restriction on mechanisms for decentralized decision making, and 2) agents act in
a pure-consequentialistically rational manner.
The rst assumption can be justied whenever the main concern is to draw
a demarcation line between what SCC is or is not implementable. However, if
the theory of implementation is to have any practical meaning, implementable
SCC s must rely on mechanisms having unquestionable features whose suitability
depends greatly on the type of implementation problems at hand (Jackson, 1992).
For instance, in the case of resource allocation problems in a market structure, a
prominent and natural restriction on mechanisms is represented by price-quantity
mechanisms, because only information reported by agents in the form of prices and
their own quantity demands is required for decision making.
Indeed, a central concern in resource allocation problems of classical economic
environments regards the types of resource allocations implemented by the so-called
competitive market, in which each agent exchanges the information of prices and
their own demand quantities to determine an allocation. This interest has triggered
fundamental theoretical contributions which have sharpened the understanding of
market mechanisms in two di¤erent ways. On the one hand, when individuals in
the economy are sincere, the Walrasian equilibrium allocations are implemented as
being Pareto e¢ cient via a competitive market, as suggested by the general equi-
librium theory and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. Conversely,
when agents strategize, as Hurwicz (1978), Otani and Sicilian (1982) and Thom-
son (1984) discuss, the market mechanism is manipulated by such agents so that
the equilibrium allocations are identical to the lens-shaped area delimited by the
agentstrue o¤er curves, which are not truthfully Walrasian. This latter strand of
literature suggests that the existence of a scheme for punishing those manipulating
agents is indispensable to the successful operation of the market mechanism. Sem-
inal studies such as Hurwicz (1979), Schmeidler (1980), Postlewaite and Wettstein
(1989), and Tian (1992, 2000) design, for implementation of the (constrained) Wal-
rasian equilibrium allocations, a desirable price-quantity mechanism which could
be regarded as a formulation of a comprehensive market mechanism consisting of a
trading rule (a scheme for the exchange of the information of prices and quantities)
and a punishment scheme.
1Many studies of Nash implementation have followed, such as Saijo (1988), Moore and Repullo
(1990), Dutta and Sen (1991) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2012a). Hereafter unless otherwise
specied equilibriumshould be understood as Nash equilibrium, and implementationas Nash
implementation.
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Following the criticism of Jackson (1992) and the above mentioned works in
economic environments, Dutta et al. (1995), Sjöström (1996), and Saijo et al.
(1996, 1999) initiate the theory of natural implementation, which denes the class
of natural mechanisms as being appropriate for the allocation problems in economic
environments and then characterizes the class of SCC s that are implementable by
natural mechanisms. A typical example is of a price-quantity mechanism satisfying
individual feasibility, balancedness, forthrightness, and the best response property;
henceforth, natural price-quantity mechanism.2
The second assumption is that agents behave in a pure-consequentialistically
rational manner. In other words, the maximization of material gains is the only
intention of agents actions. This is frequently criticized for excluding honesty
as a powerful motivator.3 In fact, simple reasoning and everyday observation
suggest that a concern about honesty is an important determinant of behavior.
Furthermore, actual behavior is often the outcome of a compromise between what
honesty prescribes and what the pursuit of material gains dictates. Experimental
evidence conrms these impressions (see Green et al., 2009).
Acknowledging these criticisms, Dutta and Sen (2012) address the question of
implementation in the abstract social choice framework where some of the agents
share the virtue of honesty in their decentralized decision making.4 Formulating
an agent having a weak sense of the virtue of honesty as a partially honest one,
who prefers to be truthful in her preference prole report when a lie does not
better serve her material interests, and assuming that there exists at least one
such partially honest agent in the society and the mechanism designer does not
know her identity, Dutta and Sen (2012) show that in a society with three or more
agents, any SCC satisfying the no-veto power condition is implementable.5
This line of research is particularly relevant if the task at hand is to achieve
societal goals via market like-mechanisms. Indeed, "Cutthroat competitiveness in
the market can go together with strict adherence to norms of honesty" as Elster
(1989, p. 102) states, but the aforementioned literature has neglected the virtue of
honesty as a self-imposed standard of conduct, and so has failed to appreciate its
inuence on the design of market-like mechanisms. There is, therefore, a need to
develop decentralized decision making processes that can take into account more
sophisticated behavior than has been analyzed up until this point, in order to
answer questions such as: What are the economic e¤ects of honesty in the design of
market like-mechanisms? Which implementation problems can be resolved through
honestly motivated behaviour and which limitations cannot be overcome? This
2The denition of natural price-quantity mechanism with these four conditions was rstly
given by Saijo et al. (1996).
3For instructive discussions on the role of emotions and norms in economics, see Bowles and
Gintis (2000), Camerer (2003), Elster (1998), Kreps (1997), Sen (1997) and Suzumura and Xu
(2001).
4The rst seminal work related to this subject is of Matsushima (2008a, 2008b). Moreover,
there are seminal related works such as Glazer and Rubinstein (1998), Eliaz (2002), Corchón and
Herrero (2004) and Kartik and Tercieux (2012).
5A complete characterization is provided in Lombardi and Yoshihara (2013).
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paper focuses on classical exchange economies in which pure-consequentialistically
rational agents and partially honest agents coexist, limits its analysis to natural
price-quantity mechanisms, and devises two di¤erent types of honestly motivated
behavior.
The rst type is a weak notion in that only the announcement of demand quan-
tity is relevant for agentshonest behavior. Thus, a partially honest agent in this
weak sense strictly prefers to report her true demand quantity rather than misre-
port it whenever the consequences of both actions are indi¤erent in her preference
over outcomes, but she is not concerned about honesty in her price announcements.
This is a very limited deviation from the standard natural implementation set-up,
since the degree of honesty injected into implementation problems is minimized,
as in the approach of Dutta and Sen (2012). However, the scope of naturally im-
plementable SCC s in such a setting is greatly enlarged in comparison with the
standard set-up, as will be argued later. The second type of partial honesty is of a
slightly stronger notion than the rst, in that the announcement of both price and
demand quantity is relevant. Although this notion is not a minimal injection of
the virtue of honesty, causal introspection indicates that it is not unrealistic for an
agent to have strict preferences for reports that disclose all the true information
in her hands when a lie does not lead to any better outcome.
For each of the two notions of partial honesty, this paper provides a full charac-
terization of Nash implementable e¢ cient SCC s by natural price-quantity mech-
anisms when there is at least one partially honest agent in a society with more
than two persons. Note that in this paper, as in Saijo et al. (1999), no e¢ cient
SCC is restricted to interior points. It is therefore possible that boundary SCC -
optimal allocations exist in some economies. Moreover, since no di¤erentiability of
utility functions is assumed, there are multiple e¢ ciency price vectors correspond-
ing to an SCC -optimal allocation, as in Saijo et al. (1999). Unlike the case of
Dutta and Sen (2012) and Lombardi and Yoshihara (2012b),6 it is not true that
every e¢ cient SCC is implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism, even
if there is at least one partially honest agent. Indeed, neither of the two repre-
sentative fair allocation rules such as the No-envy and e¢ cient correspondence7
and the e¢ cient egalitarian-equivalent correspondence is implementable by such
comprehensive market mechanisms.
Note that the Walrasian correspondence does not satisfy Maskin monotonic-
ity (Maskin, 1999), and it is, therefore, not implementable, as shown by Hurwicz
et al. (1995). Thus, works on implementation of the Walrasian correspondence
such as Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) and Tian (1992, 2000)8 replace the Wal-
6Lombardi and Yoshihara (2012b; Theorem 1) show that every e¢ cient SCC is implementable
by a natural price-allocation mechanism whenever there is at least one partial honest agent in
the weak sense.
7However, this correspondence is Nash-implementable by some simple mechanism, as in Thom-
son (2005).
8Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) and Tian (1992, 2000) consider the domain restriction
in which every Walrasian equilibrium allocation is interior in every admissible economy. Since
the Walrasian correspondence and the constrained Walrasian correspondence are identical in a
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rasian correspondence with the constrained Walrasian correspondence (Hurwicz et
al. 1995) as the target of implementation problems. Otherwise, designed mecha-
nisms for implementation of the Walrasian correspondence, such as Hurwicz (1979)
and Schemeidler (1980), must be individually infeasible,9 though individual fea-
sibility and balancedness seem to be indispensable for characterizing market-like
mechanisms.
However, one of the most striking implications of this paper is that the Wal-
rasian correspondence is implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism
whenever there is at least one partially honest agent. To be more precise, given
that there is at least one partially honest agent in the weak sense, the Walrasian
correspondence is implementable by such a mechanism in economies with two
commodities, though it is not implementable in economies with more than two. In
contrast, given that there is at least one partially honest agent in the strong sense,
the Walrasian correspondence is implementable by such a mechanism in all pure
exchange economies.
Combined with the existing works, the above result may provide a behav-
ioral foundation for the theory of the Walrasian equilibrium. Indeed, our main
result may indicate that given the presumption of strategic agents, a careful and
thoughtful design of comprehensive market mechanisms is insu¢ cient, and that the
presence of the virtue of honesty is indispensable for decentralized implementation
of the Walrasian equilibrium allocations.
The results of the paper are summarized in Table 1 of section 4 and compared
with those found in the conventional framework.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
formal environment. Section 3 provides the characterization results and explores
their consequences. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. The appendix includes
proofs omitted from the text.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
There are n  3 agents in N  f1; :::; ng and `  2 distinct commodities in
L  f1; :::; `g. Unless otherwise specied, we assume that the cardinality of L
is `  2. R is the set of all real numbers; R+ (R++) denotes the set of all non-
negative (positive) real numbers; R` is the Cartesian product of ordered `-tuples
of real numbers, whereas R`+ (R`++) denotes its non-negative (positive) orthant.
Vector inequalities are dened as follows: For all x; y 2 R`, x  y if x`  y` for
each ` 2 L, x > y if x  y and x 6= y, and x y if x` > y` for each ` 2 L.
such domain, it is not inappropriate to state that they consider Nash implementation of the
constrained Walrasian correspondence.
9Note that Maskin (1999)s original framework of implementation problems presumes that
every mechanism has an outcome function whose range is the set of feasible social alternatives,
which implies that in the case of economic environments, every mechanism must be individually
feasible.
4
Each i(2 N) is characterized by a consumption spaceR`+ (where xi = (xi1; :::; xi`) 2
R`+ is the is commodity bundle), by an endowment vector !i 2 R`+ and by a pref-
erence relation dened over R`+.10 We assume that is preferences have a utility
representation ui : R`+ ! R which is continuous and quasi-concave on R`+, and
either strictly monotonic on R`+ or strictly monotonic on R`++ where the utility
of every interior consumption bundle is strictly higher than the utility of any con-
sumption bundle on the boundary. U is the class of all such utility functions,
whereas Ui is the class of admissible utility functions for i. Given a prole of en-
dowment vectors, we denote
P
i2N !i  
 2 R`++ as the aggregate endowment. It
is assumed that the distribution of endowments is known and xed.
For i, ui 2 Ui, and xi 2 R`+, L (xi; ui) 

x0i 2 R`+ j x0i  
 and ui (xi)  ui (x0i)
	
denotes the weak lower contour set of agent i for ui at xi. An economy is
specied by a list u = (ui)i2N 2 UN  i2NUi. An allocation is a list of
bundles x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn`+ , whereas a feasible allocation is an allocation
x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn`+ such that
P
i2N xi = 
. The set of all feasible allocations is
denoted by A.11
A social choice correspondence (SCC ) is a multi-valued mapping F : UN  A
such that for each u 2 UN , F (u) is a non-empty subset of feasible allocations, that
is, ? 6= F (u)  A.12 Unless specied otherwise, we do not assume that for all
u 2 UN and all x 2 F (u), xi  0 for all i. The set of (Pareto) e¢ cient allocations
for the economy u 2 UN , denoted P (u), is P (u)  fx 2 A jthere is no y 2 A :
ui (yi) > ui (xi) for all ig. An SCC F dened on UN is e¢ cient if for any u 2 UN ,
F (u)  P (u) holds. F is the class of all e¢ cient SCC s dened on UN . Among
many elements of F , we shall be concerned with the following well-known SCC s:
Pareto correspondence P : P (u) = fx 2 A j there is no y 2 A : ui (yi) > ui (xi) for
all ig.
No-envy and e¢ cient correspondence NP : NP (u)  fx 2 A j ui (xi)  ui (xj) for
all i and jg \ P (u).
Walrasian correspondence W : W (u)  fx 2 A jthere is p 2 R`+ s.t. for all i,
p  xi = p  !i and for all yi 2 R`+, ui (xi)  ui (yi) if p  yi  p  !ig.
Constrained Walrasian correspondence Wc: Wc (u)  fx 2 A jthere is p 2 R`+
s.t. for all i, p  xi = p  !i and for all yi 2 R`+, ui (xi)  ui (yi) if yi  
 and
p  yi  p  !ig.
E¢ cient egalitarian-equivalent correspondence EE: EE (u)  fx 2 A j there is a
unique maximal number  2 (0; 1) s.t. ui (xi) = ui (
) for all ig \ P (u).
For any (ui; xi) 2 Ui  R`+, Vi (xi; ui)  fyi 2 R`+jyi  
 and ui (xi)  ui (yi)g
denotes the weak upper contour set of agent i for ui at xi. Given (ui; xi) 2 UiR`+,
10Hereafter unless otherwise specied ishould be understood as agent i 2 N .
11Note that because of this denition of feasible allocations, any admissible domain UN in this
paper cannot be separable in the sense of Dutta and Sen (2012).
12The weak set inclusion is denoted by , while the strict set inclusion is denoted by .
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a price vector p belonging to the unit simplex , that is, p 2 , is said to be a sub-
gradient of ui at xi if px0i  pxi for all x0i 2 Vi (xi; ui). The set of all sub-gradients
of ui at xi, that is, ui (xi)  fp 2 jpx0i  pxi for all x0i 2 Vi (xi; ui)g, is called the
sub-di¤erential of ui at xi. For any (x; u) 2 Rn`+ UN , let  (x; u)  \i2Nui (xi).
Notice that x 2 P (u) if  (x; u) is non-empty. In words,  (x; u) consists of prices
p each of which is normal to a hyperplane separating the weak upper contour sets
of all agents with u at x. Any p 2  (x; u) is referred to as an e¢ ciency price for
u at x.13
A mechanism is a pair   (M; g), where M  M1  :::  Mn, with each
Mi being a (non-empty) set and g : M ! Rn`. It consists of a message space
M , where Mi is the message space for i, and an outcome function g such that
g (m) = (gi (m))i2N 2 Rn` for each m 2 M . mi 2 Mi denotes a generic message
(or strategy) for i. A message prole is denoted by m  (m1; :::;mn) 2 M . For
m 2 M and j, let m j  (m1; :::;mj 1;mj+1; :::;mn) 2 i2NnfjgMi  M j. Given
m j 2 M j and mj 2 Mj, (mj;m j) is the message prole consisting of mj and
m j. g (Mi;m i) is the attainable set of i at m i: That is, the set of bundles that
i can induce when the other agents select m i.
Throughout the paper, we focus our attention on completely feasible mecha-
nisms (Saijo et. al, 1996, 1999). A mechanism  = (M; g) is:
Individually feasible if g (m) 2 Rn`+ for each m 2M ;
Balanced if
P
i2N gi (m) = 
 for each m 2M .
A mechanism  = (M; g) is completely feasible if it is individually feasible and
balanced. Such a mechanism  has the property that g (m) 2 A for each m 2M .
2.2 Partially honest implementation
For any mechanism  and i, a truth-telling correspondence is a correspondence
T i : UN  F  Mi such that, for each (u; F ) 2 UN  F , ? 6= T i (u; F )  Mi.
An interpretation of the set T i (u; F ) is that given the mechanism  and a pair
(u; F ) 2 UN F , i behaves truthfully at the message prole m 2M if and only if
mi 2 T i (u; F ). We refer the reader to Denition 5 and Denition 6 of section 3
for two di¤erent denitions of truthful messages for price-quantity mechanisms.
For any (i; u) 2 N  UN , let <ui be is weak order over M under the economy
u. The asymmetric part of <ui is denoted by ui , while the symmetric part is
denoted by sui . For any u 2 UN , <u is the prole of weak orders overM under the
economy u; in other words, <u (<ui )i2N . As in Dutta and Sen (2012), partially
honest behavior is dened as follows.
13If ui 2 Ui is di¤erentiable for all i 2 N and F 2 F selects only interior allocations, ? 6=
F (u)  A \ Rn`++ for any u 2 UN , then the set  (x; u) is a singleton whenever x 2 F (u); in
particular, the set  (x; u) has the form of fpg   such that rui (xi) = p for all i 2 N , where
rui (xi) denotes the gradient vector at xi which is normalized to belong to the unit simplex .
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Definition 1. An agent h 2 N is a partially honest agent if for any mechanism
, any u 2 UN , any F 2 F , any m  (mh;m h) and any m0  (m0h;m h) 2 M ,
the following properties hold:
(i) Ifmh 2 T h (u; F ),m0h =2 T h (u; F ) and uh (gh (m))  uh (gh (m0)), then (m;m0) 2uh;
(ii) otherwise, (m;m0) 2<uh if and only if uh (gh (m))  uh (gh (m0)).
Assume also that, for any i who is not partially honest, it follows that for any
mechanism , any u 2 UN , any F 2 F , any m  (mi;m i), and any m0 
(m0i;m i) 2M , (m;m0) 2<ui if and only if ui (gi (m))  ui (gi (m0)).
The following informational assumption holds throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. There are partially honest agents in N . The mechanism designer
knows that there are partially honest agents in N , though she does not know their
identities or their exact number.
The mechanism designer cannot exclude any agent from being partially honest
on the basis of information given by Assumption 1. To formalize this fact, let
? 6= H  2Nn f?g be a class of non-empty subsets of N . Given the truly limited
information injected by Assumption 1, in what follows we shall view H as the class
of conceivable sets of partially honest agents. Although Assumption 1 only implies
that #H  2, we might generally view H as being identical to 2Nn f?g.
A mechanism  induces a class of (non-cooperative) games with partially honest
agents f(;<u) j (u;H) 2 UN Hg. Given a game (;<u), we say that m 2M is
a (pure strategy)Nash equilibrium with partially honest agents at u if and only if for
all i,
 
m;
 
mi;m

 i
 2<ui for all mi 2Mi. Given a game (;<u), NE (;<u) de-
notes the set of (Nash) equilibrium message proles of (;<u), whereas NA (;<u)
represents the corresponding set of (Nash) equilibrium allocations.
Definition 2. A mechanism  partially honest implements F 2 F in Nash equi-
libria, or simply partially honest implements F , if and only if F (u) = NA (;<u)
for all u 2 UN and all H 2 H.
If such a mechanism exists, then F is partially honest (Nash) implementable.
Denition 2 is similar, but not identical to, the standard denition of implemen-
tation.14 First, the equilibrium allocations are given by the game (;<u) rather
than by the game (; u). Second, the equivalence of the set of SCC -optimal allo-
cations with the set of Nash equilibrium allocations is required not only for any
economy u 2 UN but also for any conceivable set H 2 H.
3 Natural price-quantity mechanisms
A price-quantity mechanism is a mechanism in which each agents message consists
of reporting a price vector as well as her own consumption bundle. Moreover, it is
said to be natural if some elementary but important properties hold (Saijo et al.,
14The two denitions are however identical if H = ?.
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1996, 1999). In addition to the property of complete feasibility (dened in sub-
section 2.1), a natural price-quantity mechanism satises the best response property
and the condition of forthrightness.
The property of non-emptiness of the agents best response function, introduced
by Jackson et al. (1994), can be formulated as follows:
Definition 3. (Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava, 1994) A mechanism  satises
the best response property if, for all i, all ui 2 Ui, and all m i 2 M i, there exists
mi 2Mi such that ui (gi (mi;m i))  ui (gi (m0i;m i)) for all m0i 2Mi.
Before introducing forthrightness a little more notation is needed: For each
u 2 UN , each x 2 F (u), and each p 2  (x; u), dene the set F 1 (x; p) as
F 1 (x; p)  fu0 2 UN j x 2 F (u0) and p 2  (x; u0)g ,
whereas the sets F 1! (x; p) and 
F (x; u) are dened respectively as follows:
F 1! (x; p)  fu0 2 UN j x 2 F (u0) and fpg =  (x; u0)g , (1)
F (x; u)  p 2  (x; u) j F 1! (x; p) 6= ?	 . (2)
Then, for each u 2 UN and each x 2 F (u), dene the set F (x; u) as follows:
F (x; u) 

F (x; u) if it is non-empty,
 (x; u) otherwise.
(3)
Any p 2 F (x; u) is referred to as an e¢ ciency price for u and F at x.15
It is important to observe that the di¤erence between F (x; u) and  (x; u)
centers on whether it is possible to select e¢ ciency prices from the set  (x; u)
which are relevant for the given u and F at the F -optimal allocation x. The
reason for this selection is that not all e¢ ciency prices are equally important from
the standpoint of an F -optimal allocation. This is particularly true when F is the
(constrained) Walrasian.
Definition 4. An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural
price-quantity mechanism if there exists a mechanism  = (M; g) such that:
(i)  partially honestly implements F .
(ii) For each i, Mi = Q, where Q 

xi 2 R`+ j xi  

	
.
(iii) For each u 2 UN , each x 2 F (u), and each p 2 F (x; u), if mi = (p; xi) for
each i, then m 2 NE (;<u) and g (m) = x.
(iv)  is completely feasible.
(v)  satises the best response property.
15Note that, for any p 2  (x; u) with x 2 F (u), there always exists u0 2 UN such that fpg =
 (x; u0) whenever UN contains the set of all linear utility functions. Indeed, if u0i (xi) = p xi for
all i 2 N , then fpg =  (x; u0). However, note that F 1! (x; p) 6= ? does not necessarily follow
from the case fpg =  (x; u0). For instance, if F = Wc, it is possible that x 2Wc (u), p 2  (x; u),
fpg =  (x; u0), but x =2 Wc (u0), whenever p is not a (constrained) Walrasian equilibrium price
vector corresponding to x 2Wc (u).
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Call  a natural price-quantity mechanism if  satises requirements (ii)-(v) of
Denition 4.
Requirement (iii) of the denition just stated is the forthrightness condition for
a price-quantity mechanism: For every economy u and F -optimal allocation x at u,
if each i reports an e¢ ciency price p for u and F at x and her assigned consumption
bundle xi, then the prole m constitutes an equilibrium in which i receives xi. The
condition requires therefore, that in equilibrium each agent receives what she has
announced as a bundle.16 Observe that our forthrightness condition di¤ers from
that of Saijo et al. (1999) because it applies only to e¢ ciency prices in F (x; u)
rather than to those in  (x; u). We shall make use of this di¤erence in sub-section
3.3, which will be relevant for the case that F is the (constrained) Walrasian.17
We shall now introduce two di¤erent notions of honesty for a price-quantity
mechanism, called weak honesty and strong honesty. The weak honesty requires
that only the consumption bundle xi reported by i be consistent with F (u): That
is, (xi; x i) 2 F (u) for some x i. The strong honesty requires not only that
xi be consistent with F (u), but also that the price vector reported by i be an
e¢ ciency price for u and F at an F -optimal allocation
 
xi; x
0
 i

. The di¤erence
between the weak and strong honesty centers therefore, on whether or not the price
announcement component p of the message must also be consistent with the true
economy u and the social goal F . The notions can be stated as follows:
Definition 5 (Weak honesty). Given a natural price-quantity mechanism ,
an economy u 2 UN and an SCC F 2 F , a partially honest agent h has a weak
intrinsic preference towards honesty if the range of her truth-telling correspondence
is T h (u; F ) 

(p; xh) 2 Q j 9x h 2 R(n 1)` : (xh; x h) 2 F (u)
	
.
Definition 6 (Strong honesty). Given a natural price-quantity mechanism
, an economy u 2 UN and an SCC F 2 F , a partially honest agent h has a strong
intrinsic preference towards honesty if the range of her truth-telling correspondence
is
T h (u; F ) 

(p; xh) 2 Q j 9x h 2 R(n 1)` : (xh; x h) 2 F (u) , &
9x0 h 2 R(n 1)` :
 
xh; x
0
 h
 2 F (u) & p 2 F   xh; x0 h ; u	 .
3.1 Axiomatic characterization: Weak honesty
In this sub-section, we shall consider the case of weak honesty. Thus, in addi-
tion to Assumption 1, the mechanism designer knows that partially honest agents
16The reader should refer to Dutta et al. (1995) and Saijo et al. (1996) for a much fuller
discussion on forthrightness than is presented here.
17Indeed, in Saijo et al. (1999), it is possible that, if x is an interior Walrasian allocation for
some u, and every i announces the consumption bundle xi and the same non-Walrasian equilib-
rium price vector p 2  (x; u) nWc (x; u), then x must be a Nash equilibrium outcome. However,
such an unanimously false announcement of the Walrasian equilibrium price makes it di¢ cult to
approximate every agents true budget set which should be induced by the truthful Walrasian
equilibrium price. Such a di¢ culty can be avoided in our formulation of the forthrightness.
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have weak preferences towards honesty. We shall propose two conditions which
are together necessary and su¢ cient for an e¢ cient SCC to be partially honest
implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism.
The rst condition is called Monotonicity with Weak Honesty (M-WH ). Before
introducing it, a little more notation is needed: For each u 2 UN , x 2 F (u), and
p 2 F (x; u), let Fi (x; p)  \u02F 1(x;p)L (xi; u0i) for each i.
Condition M-WH. For any given H 2 H, for all u; u 2 UN , all x 2 F (u), and
all p 2 F (x; u), if Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all i and if x =2 F (u), then for
some h 2 H, xh 6= xh for all x 2 F (u).
For any H 2 H, any u 2 UN , any x 2 F (u) and any p 2 F (x; u), M-WH
requires that if the economy u moves to a new economy u 2 UN in such a way
that for each i the weak lower contour set for ui at xi contains the set 
F
i (x; p) and
if x =2 F (u), then for some h 2 H the bundle xh can never be a weakly truthful
F -optimal one for u, in the sense that xh 6= xh holds for all x 2 F (u).
M-WH is weaker than the Generalized Monotonicity (GM ) introduced by Saijo
et al. (1999). In fact, M-WH applies to price vectors belonging to F (x; u) rather
than to  (x; u). Moreover, while GM requires that an F -optimal allocation x for u
should be F -optimal for u if Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) holds for each i,M-WH requires
such an invariant property if, in addition, it holds that for each h 2 H the bundle
xh is a weakly truthful F -optimal one for u, in the sense that
 
xh; x

 h
 2 F (u)
holds for some x h 2 Qn 1.
The second condition, called Punishment with Weak Honesty (P-WH ), is a
weaker variant of condition GPQ introduced by Saijo et al. (1999). Before stating
P-WH, a more notation is needed. Let p 2  and x = (xi)i2N 2 Q  :::  Q be
given. Let xi 


 Pj 6=i xj; x i. Dene the set F 1 (xi; p) as follows:
F 1
 
xi; p
   F 1! (xi; p) if F 1! (xi; p) 6= ?,
F 1 (xi; p) if F 1! (x
i; p) = ?, and @p0 2  : F 1! (xi; p0) 6= ?.
Let IF (p; x)  i 2 N j F 1 (xi; p) 6= ?	. For each x =2 A, a member of the set
IF (p; x) is a potential deviator. For each i, ui 2 Ui, and xi 2 R`+, let @L (xi; ui)
denote the upper boundary of L (xi; ui), that is, @L (xi; ui)  fx0i 2 L (xi; ui) j
ui (xi) = ui (x
0
i)g. Finally, for each i, xi 2 Q is weakly truthful for u0 2 UN if and
only if (xi; x^ i) 2 F (u0) for some x^ i 2 Qn 1.
Condition P-WH . For any given H 2 H, and any (p; x) 2   Qn such that
IF (p; x) = N and x =2 A, there exists z (p; x) 2 A such that:
(i) zi (p; x) 2 Fi (xi; p) for all i.
(ii) For each i, there exists a function Si (; (p; x i)) : Q! Q such that for all
(p0; x0i) 2 Q,
(a) if there exist u0 2 UN and xi 2 Q such that IF (p; x) = N , where x 
(xi ; x i), and 
F
j (x
j; p)  L  zj (p; x) ; u0j for all j 2 N and if x0i is weakly
truthful for u0, then Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2 Fi (xi; p);
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(b) otherwise, Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = 0.
(iii) For all u 2 UN , if Fi (xi; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui ) for all i and if z (p; x) =2
F (u), then there exists h 2 H such that:
(a) xh is not weakly truthful for u, and
(b) there exists (p0; x0h) 2 Q, with x0h weakly truthful for u, such that Sh ((p0; x0h) ; (p; x h)) 2
@L (zh (p; x) ; u

h).
Let us briey discuss P-WH. This condition applies to the case in which each
agent announces the same price vector p, the announced quantities prole is not
a feasible allocation and all agents are potential deviators: That is, for each i,
mi = (p; xi) where (x1; :::; xn) =2 A, and IF (p; x) = N . As Saijo et al. (1996,
1999) state, an important problem for implementation by natural price-quantity
mechanisms is to identify who should be punished in such a case. A solution to
this problem is to punish simultaneously all agents by assigning to each i a feasible
bundle which is not better than the bundle 
  Pj 6=i xj, regardless of is true
utility function. Parallelly to part (i) of GPQ, part (i) of P-WH requires that a
feasible punishment allocation z (p; x) exists in such a case.18
To discuss part (ii) and part (iii) of P-WH, let us consider a situation in which a
punishment allocation z (p; x) has already been assigned to agents. In some cases it
is necessary to identify the property of bundles that i can achieve when she changes
her initial announcement (p; xi) into weakly truthful ones. In this regards, part
(ii) of P-WH requires that for each i there should exist a function Si (; (p; x i))
that assigns feasible bundles to i when she changes her announcement (p; xi), while
keeping the other agentsannouncements xed. This function has the property of
punishment, in that i can never get from the assigned bundle a utility higher than
that derived from the bundle 
  Pl 6=i xl, regardless of is true utility function.
Finally, the contrapositive of part (iii) of P-WH reads as follows: If for an economy
u it is the case that for each i the weak lower contour set for ui at zi (x; p) contains
the intersection set Fi (x; p), and if for each h 2 H the bundle xh is weakly truthful
for u or uh (Sh ((p
0; x0h) ; (p; x h))) < u

h (zh (p; x)) for all pairs (p
0; x0h) such that x
0
h
is weakly truthful for u, then z (p; x) must be F -optimal for u. In other words,
if the punishment allocation z (p; x) corresponds to a truthful equilibrium for u
and the given set H, then it must be F -optimal for u.
We shall now establish our rst characterization result.
18Note that, although P-WH -(i) is very similar to GPQ-(i) of Saijo et al. (1999), there is a
small di¤erence: In Saijo et al. (1999), the set IF (p; x) and the intersection set Fi
 
xi; p

are
respectively dened by taking F 1
 
xi; p

as the domain of potential economies, whereas we take
F 1
 
xi; p

as the domain. The essence of this di¤erence is that u 2 F 1  xi; p implies not only
that xi is F -optimal for u, but also that p is an important and relevant e¢ ciency price in that it
can support xi as an F -optimal allocation for u. In contrast, u 2 F 1  xi; p implies that xi is
F -optimal for u, and p is simply an e¢ ciency price for u at xi.
For instance, if F = Wc, then W 1c
 
xi; p
 6= ? implies that xi becomes a constrained Wal-
rasian equilibrium allocation for an economy, and in such an economy, p becomes a constrained
Walrasian equilibrium price vector. In contrast, although W 1c
 
xi; p
 6= ? implies that xi be-
comes a constrained Walrasian equilibrium allocation for an economy, it may correspond to the
case where p can never be a constrained Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
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Theorem 1. Let n  3 and suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 5 holds.
An SCC F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity
mechanism if and only if it satises M-WH and P-WH.
The reader will have observed that the rationales behindM-WH and P-WH di¤er.
In fact, M-WH can be viewed as a condition to suggest that the behavior of an
e¢ cient SCC must be consistent with truthful announcements of bundles, whereas
P-WH can be viewed as a condition to suggest that an SCC must allow the
existence of feasible allocations in order to construct a punishment scheme.
3.2 Axiomatic characterization: Strong honesty
In this subsection, we shall be concerned with the case of strong honesty. Thus,
in addition to Assumption 1, the mechanism designer knows that partially honest
agents have strong preferences towards honesty. We propose below a condition
called Monotonicity and Punishment with Strong Honesty (MP-SH ), which is nec-
essary and su¢ cient for an e¢ cient SCC to be partially honest implementable by
a natural price-quantity mechanism.
To facilitate our discussion, we introduce some terminology and notation that
will be convenient: For each i, a pair (p; xi) 2 Q is strongly truthful for u0 2 UN
if and only if (xi; x^ i) 2 F (u0) for some x^ i 2 R(n 1)`+ , and p 2 F ((xi; x i) ; u0)
for some x i 2 R(n 1)`+ with (xi; x i) 2 F (u0). For each i and (pj; xj)j2N 2
(Q)n, with p = pj for all j, let x  (xj)j2N , (p; x)  (pj; xj)j2N , and (p; x i) 
(pj; xj)j2Nnfig. For each x = (xi)i2N 2 Q  :::  Q, we shall recall that xi 

 Pj 6=i xj; x i.
Condition MP-SH . There exists a map z : (Q)n ! Qn such that, for any
given H 2 H and any (pj; xj)j2N 2 (Q)n:
(i) The following requirements are satised:
(i.a) If pj = p for each j, then:
(i.a.1) If IF (p; x) = N , then z (p; x) 2 A, with z (p; x) = x for x 2 A, such that
zi (p; x) 2 Fi (xi; p) for each i.
(i.a.2) If 1  IF (p; x)  n  1, then z (p; x) 2 A such that for each i 2 IF (p; x),
zi (p; x) 2 Fi (xi; p) if (p; xi) is strongly truthful for some u0 2 UN ,
zi (p; x) = 0 otherwise.
(i.a.3) If
IF (p; x) = 0, then z (p; x) = 0.
(i.b) If there exists i 2 N such that pj = p for each j 2 Nn fig and pi 6= p, then:
(i.b.1) If there exists (u0; xi ) 2 UN Q with IF (p; x) = N , where x  (x i; xi ),
and Fj (x
j; p)  L  zj (p; x) ; u0j for each j 2 N and if (pi; xi) is strongly truthful
for u0, then z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) 2 A with zi ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) 2 Fi (xi; p).
(i.b.2) Otherwise, z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = 0.
(i.c) For any other case, z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = 0.
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(ii) Moreover, for all u 2 UN , if pi = p for all i, IF (p; x) = N and Fi (xi; p) 
L (zi (p; x) ; u

i ) for all i and if z (p; x) =2 F (u), then there exists h 2 H such that:
(a) (p; xh) is not strongly truthful for u, and
(b) there exists (p0; x0h) 2   Q, which is strongly truthful for u, such that
zh ((p
0; x0h) ; (p; x h)) 2 @L (zh (p; x) ; uh).
The rationale behind MP-SH for the case that x 2 A (resp., x =2 A) is that of
M-WH (resp., P-WH ). Furthermore, the condition just stated is almost parallel
to M-WH and P-WH with di¤erences directly linked to the di¤erent notions of
honesty that they refer to. The main di¤erences can be summarized as follows:
First, part (i.b.1) of MP-SH identies the property of bundles that i can achieve
when she changes her initial announcement (p; xi) into strongly truthful ones,
while keeping the other agentsannouncements xed. Second, this identication
is also made for cases in which the initial situation is that each agent announced
the same price vector p and the announced quantities prole is F -optimal. Fi-
nally, and most signicantly, the contrapositive of part (ii) of MP-SH reads as
follows: The punishment allocation z (p; x) is F -optimal for u if for each i the
weak lower contour set for ui at zi (x; p) contains the intersection set 
F
i (x; p)
and if for each h 2 H the announcement (p; xh) is strongly truthful for u or
uh (zh ((p
0; x0h) ; (p; x h))) < u

h (zh (p; x)) for all strongly truthful pairs (p
0; x0h) for
u, that is, if z (p; x) corresponds a truthful equilibrium for u and the given set H.
Note also that part (i.a) of MP-SH extends the existence of feasible punishment
allocations to cases in which the number of agents in IF (p; x) is less than n.
We shall now establish our second characterization result.
Theorem 2. Let n  3, and suppose Assumption 1 with Denition 6 holds. Then,
F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism
if and only if F satises MP-SH.
3.3 Implications
For the remainder of the present section, we shall blend our characterization re-
sults and derive several important theorems. Unless there is specic mention to
the contrary, the domain of each SCC is the set U  U  : : : U| {z }
n-times
of all proles of
utility functions that are continuous, quasi-concave and strictly monotonic. Fur-
thermore, unless otherwise specied, we shall let H =2Nn f?g. Although some
other specications of H are possible, our specication is naturally connected with
Assumption 1 and is of the utmost importance from the viewpoint of partially
honest implementation. None of the positive results presented here can be derived
from the conventional natural implementation setting.
It is well-known that the Walrasian correspondence, W , is not natural imple-
mentable. Moreover, Saijo et al. (1999; Lemma 3) show that the constrained
Walrasian correspondence, Wc, is not implementable by any natural mechanism in
economies endowed with more than two commodities. A natural question, then, is
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whether or not W and Wc are natural implementable when agents have intrinsic
preferences towards honesty. While a positive answer is provided for Wc, the an-
swer for W depends on the type of honesty of partially honest agents and on the
number of commodities in the economy. The answers are based on the following
lemmata:
Lemma 1. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 5 holds; and let
the domain of Wc be U . Then, Wc satises M-WH.
Lemma 2. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 5 holds; and let
the domain of W and Wc be U . Then:
(i) W satises P-WH.
(ii) Wc satises P-WH.
Lemma 3. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 5 holds; let
H = 2Nn f?g and let the domain of W be U . Then:
(i) W satises M-WH when ` = 2.
(ii) W does not satisfy M-WH when `  3 and !i = 
n for all i.
Lemma 4. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 6 holds; let
H = 2Nn f?g and let the domain of W be U . Then, W satises MP-SH.
The following results are a direct consequence of the combination of the above
lemmata with either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 5 holds; and
let the domain of W and Wc be U . Then:
(i) W is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism
when ` = 2.
(ii) W is not partially honest implementable by any natural price-quantity mech-
anism when `  3.
(iii) Wc is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mechanism.
Theorem 4. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 with Denition 6 holds;
and let the domain of W be U . Then, W is partially honest implementable by a
natural price-quantity mechanism.
We shall now discuss the partially honest implementability by natural price-
quantity mechanisms of the Pareto correspondence, P , the no-envy and e¢ cient
correspondence, NP , and the e¢ cient egalitarian-equivalent correspondence, EE.
Saijo et al. (1999) show that these SCC s are not implementable by any natural
price-quantity mechanism. A natural question then, is whether or not these SCC s
are partially honest implementable. A negative answer is provided by means of
the following lemmata.
Lemma 5. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 holds; and let the domain of P
be U . Then:
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(i) P does not satisfy part (i) of P-WH if Denition 5 holds.
(ii) P does not satisfy part (i.a.1) of MP-SH if Denition 6 holds.
Proof. This is due to the fact that the Pareto correspondence does not satisfy
condition PQ(i), as shown in Saijo et al. (1996).
Lemma 6. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 holds; let H = 2Nn f?g and
let the domain of NP be U . Then:
(i) NP does not satisfy part (iii) of P-WH if Denition 5 holds.
(ii) NP does not satisfy part (ii) of MP-SH if Denition 6 holds.
Lemma 7. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 holds; let H = 2Nn f?g and
let the domain of EE be U . Then:
(i) EE does not satisfy M-WH if Denition 5 holds.
(ii) EE does not satisfy MP-SH if Denition 6 holds.
Our last theorem is a direct consequence of the above lemmata, Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2.
Theorem 5. Let n  3; suppose that Assumption 1 holds with either Denition
5 or Denition 6; let H = 2Nn f?g and let the domain of P , NP , and EE be
U . Then, none of P , NP , and EE are partially honest implementable by any
natural price-quantity mechanism.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, which introduces the weak and the strong types of partially hon-
est agent, we examined partially honest implementation by natural price-quantity
mechanisms in pure exchange economies. For each of the two types, the class of
e¢ cient SCC s that are implementable is fully identied. The implications of our
characterization results, coupled with the ndings for the two-agent economies of
the companion paper (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2012b) are summarized in Table
1 below and compared with those of Saijo et al. (1996, 1999)s characterization
result in the standard set-up. Two main conclusions can be drawn from this table.
Firstly, the main di¢ culty in implementing the Walrasian allocations in the
standard set-up can be found in the lack of the virtue of honesty in the society,
rather than in the failure to design reasonable mechanisms. This view is consis-
tent with the standard general equilibrium theory and the fundamental theorems
of welfare economics, in which all agents are assumed to be sincere. In other words,
honesty seems to be indispensable for the implementability of the Walrasian cor-
respondence.
Secondly, honesty does not seem to be a major determinant of human behavior
in solving implemenation problems of fair allocations. The failure to partially
honestly implement the no-envy and e¢ cient correspondence is to be attributed
to the impossibility of successful design of punishment schemes consistent with
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natural price-quantity mechanisms (see the proof of Lemma 6). On the other
hand, the failure to partially honestly implement the e¢ cient egalitarian-equivalent
correspondence is to be attributed to the impossibility of nullifying the appeal to
any variant of Maskin monotonicity. No degree of honesty can help to resolve these
impossibilities.
We shall close this section with some remarks for two-agent economies: It is
well-known that the e¢ cient egalitarian-equivalent correspondence violates Maskin
monotonicity. Thus, it is not implementable. In our companion paper, we found
that this SCC is partially honest implementable by a natural price-quantity mech-
anism in economies with more than two commodities. Although this is a positive
and important result, this SCC is not implementable by any natural price-quantity
mechanism in economies with two commodities, for the same reason that it is not
implementable in economies with more than two agents. The existence, therefore,
of the virtue of honesty in the society is not helpful, in general, for the natural
implementation of this SCC.
TABLE 1: Honest set-up/Standard set-up Comparison Table
A summary of results
Number of agents: n = 2 n  3
Types of honesty: Weak honesty Weak honesty Strong honesty
Wc yes/no yes/no yes/no
W : ` = 2 yes/no yes/no yes/no
SCC s : W : `  3 yes/no no/no yes/no
NP yes/yes no/no no/no
EE : ` = 2 no/no no/no no/no
EE : `  3 yes/no no/no no/no
P no/no no/no no/no
Wc, the constrained Walrasian correspondence; W , the Walrasian correspondence;
NP , the non-envy and e¢ cient correspondence; EE, the egalitarian-equivalent and e¢ cient correspondence;
P , the Pareto correspondence; ` ( 2), number of commodities in the economy.
Appendix
Before proceeding, we shall recall that xi 


 Pj 6=i xj; x i and that @L (xi; ui) 
fx0i 2 L (xi; ui) j ui (xi) = ui (x0i)g.
Proof of Theorem 1
First, we suppose that F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural
price-quantity mechanism  = (M; g), and shall show that F satises M-WH and
P-WH.
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Let (H; u; x; p) 2 H  UN  F (u) F (x; u) and let mi  (p; xi) 2 Q for
each i. By forthrightness, g (m) = x and m 2 NE  ;<u0 for all u0 2 F 1 (x; p),
whence it follows that gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (x; p) for all i. If x =2 F (u) for some
u 2 UN and if Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all i, it follows that mi =2 T i (u; F ) and
((m0i;m i) ;m) 2ui for some i 2 H and some m0i 2 T i (u; F ), then xi 6= xi for
all x 2 F (u), as sought. This shows that F satises M-WH for all H 2 H.
Let H 2 H, let mi = (p; xi) 2   Q for each i, and let p and x = (xi)i2N
be such that IF (p; x) = N and x =2 A. For any i, let m = ( m i;mi) where
mi =

p;
 Pl 6=i xl. By forthrightness, g (m) = xi and m 2 NE  ;<u0
for all u0 2 F 1 (xi; p), whence it follows that gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (xi; p). But
since i is arbitrary, it follows that gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (xi; p) for all i. Now let
z (p; x) = g ( m) and use the fact that gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (xi; p) for all i to obtain
that zi (p; x) 2 Fi (xi; p) for all i. This shows that F satises part (i) of P-WH.
For any i and (p; x i) 2 Qn 1, dene the real-valued function Si (; (p; x i)) :
Q! Q as follows: For any (p0; x0i) 2 Q,
(i) if there exist u0 2 UN and xi 2 Q such that IF (p; x) = N , Fj (xj; p) 
L
 
zj (p; x
) ; u0j

for all j 2 N , where x  (xi ; x i), and if x0i is weakly truthful
for u0, then Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i))  gi ((p0; x0i) ; m i);
(ii) otherwise, Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i))  0.
Noting that xi = xi, so that Fi (x
i; p) = Fi (x
i; p), it is readily veriable that
part (ii) of P-WH is satised by the just stated denition of Si (; ).
If for some u 2 UN it holds that Fi (xi; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui ) for all i and if
z (p; x) = g ( m) =2 F (u), it follows that mi =2 T i (u; F ) and ((m0i; m i) ; m) 2ui
for some i 2 H and some m0i = (p0; x0i) 2 T i (u; F ), then ui (gi (m0i; m i)) =
ui (gi ( m)), so that xi is not weakly truthful for u
, x0i is weakly truthful for u
,
and gi (m0i; m i) 2 Fi (xi; p) \ @L (zi (p; x) ; ui ). By part (i) of the denition of
function Si (; (p; x i)), it follows that Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = gi (m0i; m i), in which
case Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2 @L (zi (p; x) ; ui ). This shows that F satises part (iii)
of P-WH.
Conversely, suppose that F satises M-WH and P-WH. Before proceeding, let
us introduce some preliminaries. Denote the boundary set of  by @. For any
vertex p 2 @ and any other p 2 , let B (p; p) be a closed ball with center p and
radius   1
2
kp; pk > 0, where kp; pk is the Euclidean distance between p and p. Let
B (p; p)  B (p; p)\. Since B (p; p) and  are cardinally equivalent, there is a
bijection  : B (p; p)! . For any i, any (p; x i) 2 Qn 1 and any vertex p 2
, dene the function ~Si (; (p; x i)) : B (p; p)Q ! Q by ~Si ((p^; x^i) ; (p; x i)) 
Si (( (p^) ; x^i) ; (p; x i)) for all (p^; x^i) 2 B (p; p)  Q. For any (x; p) 2 Qn  ,
@Fi (x; p) is the upper boundary of 
F
i (x; p), that is, @
F
i (x; p)  fyi 2 Qjyi 2
Fi (x; p) and @zi 2 Fi (x; p) such that zi  yig.
With these preliminaries and given any two xed and distinct vertices p and
p0 of @ we now dene the outcome function g of a price-quantity mechanism
 = (M; g) as follows:
Rule 1: If mi = (p; xi) for all i such that x 2 F (u0) and p 2 F (x; u0) for some
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u0 2 UN , then g (m) = x.
Rule 2: If mi = (p; xi) for all i such that x =2 A and IF (p; x) = N , then g (m) =
z (p; x), where z (p; x) is the allocation specied in part (i) of P-WH.
Rule 3: If mi = (p; xi) for all i, 1 
IF (p; x)  n  1, then:
gi (m) =
 

n jIF (p;x)j if i =2 IF (p; x) ,
0 otherwise.
Rule 4: If, for some i, (p; xl) for all l 2 Nn fig, and (pi; xi), with p 6= pi, and
i 2 IF (p; x), then:
Rule 4.1: if pi = p0, then g (m) = xi;
Rule 4.2: if pi 2 B (p; p), then:
g (m) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
 
~Si ((p
i; xi) ; (p; x i)) ;


  ~Si((pi;xi);(p;x i))
n 1

l 6=i
!
if ~Si ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) 6= 0,
xi;
 

 xi
n 1

l 6=i

if
~Si ((p
i; xi) ; (p; x i)) = 0
and xi 2 Fi (xi; p) ,
 i (xi) ;


  i(xi)
n 1

l 6=i

otherwise,
where  i : QnFi (xi; p)! @Fi (xi; p) is a surjective function;
Rule 4.3: otherwise, g (m) =

x^i;
 

 x^i
n 1

l 6=i

, where fx^ig  @Fi (xi; p)\fyi 2 R`+j
9 2 R+ s.t. yi = xig.
Rule 5: Otherwise, gi (m) = 
 and gj (m) = 0 for all j 6= i, where i is dened as
follows. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 
1  1. Let
P
i2N yi1 = t.
Furthermore, it follows that, for all i, yi1 2 [0;
1]. Let v be an integer such that
v  t < v + 1. Therefore, t = v + s where s 2 [0; 1). It follows that there is a
unique agent i 2 N such that s 2  i 1
n
; i

n

.
According to the proposed construction,  is a natural price-quantity mechanism.
We shall show that F (u) = NA (;<u) for all u 2 UN and all H 2 H. Since
it is a routine exercise to prove that F (u)  NA (;<u) for any u and any H, we
shall omit the proof here. Conversely, for any (u;H) 2 UNH, letm 2 NE (;<u)
for the given H. Since m cannot correspond to Rule 3, Rule 4, or Rule 5, m falls
either into Rule 1 or Rule 2.
Suppose that m falls into Rule 1. By Rule 4.3, we obtain that @Fi (x; p) 
gi (Mi;m i) for all i from which it follows that Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui) for all i
since m 2 NE (;<u) and since agentsutility functions are strictly monotonic.
If i 2 H and if mi =2 T i (u; F ), Rule 4.1 implies that gh (m0i;m i) = xi for any
m0i = (p
0; x0i) 2 T i (u; F ), so that ((m0i;m i) ;m) 2ui . Since this contradicts
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the assumption that m 2 NE (;<u) for the given H, mi 2 T i (u; F ) if i 2 H.
Therefore, M-WH implies that g (m) 2 F (u).
Suppose that m falls into Rule 2. By the same reasoning used for Rule 1, it
is clear that Fi (x
i; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui) for all i. If i 2 H, if mi =2 T i (u; F )
and if there exists m0i 2 T i (u; F ) such that gi (m0i;m i) 2 @L (zi (p; x) ; ui), then
((m0i;m i) ;m) 2ui . Since this contradicts the assumption that m 2 NE (;<u)
for the given H, gi (m0i;m i) =2 @L (zi (p; x) ; ui) for all m0i 2 T i (u; F ) if i 2 H
and mi =2 T i (u; F ). By the denition of function ~Si (; ) and the fact that  is a
bijection from B (p; p) to , it follows that Si ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) =2 @L (zi (p; x) ; ui)
for all p0 2  and all weakly truthfully bundle x0i 2 Q for u if i 2 H and mi =2
T i (u; F ). Therefore, part (iii) of P-WH implies that z (p; x) 2 F (u).
Since H 2 H and u 2 UN were chosen arbitrarily, the statement follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
First, we suppose that F 2 F is partially honest implementable by a natural price-
quantity mechanism  = (M; g) and shall show that F satises MP-SH. Dene the
real-valued function z : (Q)n ! Qn as follows: For any H 2 H and for any
(pj; xj)j2N 2 (Q)n, where x  (xj)j2N ,
(a) if pj = p for each j, IF (p; x) = N , then z (p; x) = g

(pj; xj)j2N

;
(b) if pj = p for each j, and 1  IF (p; x)  n  1, then for each i:
zi (p; x) =
8>><>>:
gi

(pj; xj)j2N

if i 2 S,
0 if i 2 IF (p; x) nS,

 Pk2S gk(pj ;xj)j2N
n jIF (p;x)j otherwise,
where the set S is dened as follows:
S =

i 2 IF (p; x) j (p; xi) is strongly truthful for some u0 2 UN
	
; (4)
(c) if there exists i 2 N such that pj = p for each j 2 Nn fig and pi 6= p, if
there exists (u0; xi ) 2 UN Q with IF (p; x) = N , where x  (x i; xi ), such that
Fj (x
j; p)  L  zj (p; x) ; u0j for each j 2 N , and if (pi; xi) is strongly truthful
for u0, then z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = g

(pi; xi) ; (p
j; xj)j2Nnfig

;
(d) otherwise, z

(pj; xj)j2N

= 0.
Let mi = (p; xi) 2 Q for each i. Suppose that p and x = (xi)i2N are such
that IF (p; x) = N . For any i, let m = ( m i;mi) where mi =

p;
 Pl 6=i xl.
By forthrightness, g (m) = xi and m 2 NE  ;<u0 for all u0 2 F 1 (xi; p), whence
it follows that gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (xi; p). But since i is arbitrary, it follows that
gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (xi; p) for all i. By denition of function z and the fact that
gi (Mi;m i)  Fi (xi; p) for all i, it follows that z (p; x) = g ( m) and zi (p; x) 2
Fi (x
i; p) for all i. Moreover, z (p; x) = x if x 2 A by forthrightness. This shows
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that F satises part (i.a.1) ofMP-SH. Suppose that p and x = (xi)i2N are such that
1  IF (p; x)  n   1. For any i 2 IF (p; x), it follows that xi 2 NA (;<u) for
all H 0 2 H and all u 2 F 1 (xi; p), so that gi ( m) 2 Fi (xi; p). If (4) is non-empty,
part (b) of the denition of function z implies that zi (p; x) = gi ( m) 2 Fi (xi; p)
for all i 2 S, zi (p; x) = 0 for all i 2 IF (p; x) nS and z (p; x) 2 A. If (4) is empty,
then part (b) of the denition of function z implies that zi (p; x) = 0 for each
i 2 IF (p; x) and z (p; x) 2 A. This shows that the above denition of function z
satises part (i.a.2) of MP-SH. Noting that xi = xi and Fi (x
i; p) = Fi (x
i; p), it
is readily veriable that part (i.a.3), part (i.b) and part (i.c) ofMP-SH are satised
by the denition of real-valued function z. Thus, we conclude that F satises part
(i) of MP-SH.
If for some u 2 UN it holds that Fi (xi; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui ) for all i and if
z (p; x) = g ( m) =2 F (u), it follows that mi =2 T i (u; F ) and ((m0i; m i) ; m) 2ui
for some i 2 H and some m0i = (p0; x0i) 2 T i (u; F ), then ui (gi (m0i; m i)) =
ui (gi ( m)), so that (p; xi) is not strongly truthful for u
, (p0; x0i) is strongly truth-
ful for u, and gi (m0i; m i) 2 Fi (xi; p) \ @L (zi (p; x) ; ui ). By part (c) of deni-
tion of function z, it follows that zi ((p0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = gi ((p
0; x0i) ; m i), so that
zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) 2 @L (zi (p; x) ; ui ). This shows that F satises part (ii) of
MP-SH.
Conversely, suppose that F satisesMP-SH. Before proceeding, let us introduce
some preliminaries. Denote the boundary set of  by @. For any (x; p) 2 Qn,
@Fi (x; p) is the upper boundary of 
F
i (x; p), that is, @
F
i (x; p)  fyi 2 Qjyi 2
Fi (x; p) and @zi 2 Fi (x; p) such that zi  yig. With these preliminaries we now
dene the outcome function g of a price-quantity mechanism  = (M; g) as follows:
Rule 1: If mj = (p; xj) for all j such that x  (xj)j2N 2 F (u0) and p 2 F (x; u0)
for some u0 2 UN , then g (m) = z (p; x) = x is specied in part (i.a.1) of MP-SH.
Rule 2: If mj = (p; xj) for all j such that x  (xj)j2N =2 A and IF (p; x) = N , then
g (m) = z (p; x), where z (p; x) is specied in part (i.a.1) of MP-SH.
Rule 3: If mj = (p; xj) for all j, 1 
IF (p; x)  n  1, where x  (xj)j2N , then:
gi (m) =
(

 P
k2IF (p;x) zk(p;x)
n jIF (p;x)j if i =2 IF (p; x) ,
zi (p; x) otherwise,
where z (p; x) is specied in part (i.a.2) of MP-SH.
Rule 4: If, for some i, (p; xj) for all j 2 Nn fig, and (pi; xi), with p 6= pi, and
i 2 IF (p; x), where x  (xj)j2N , then:
g (m) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
zi ((p
i; xi) ; (p; x i)) ;


 zi((pi;xi);(p;x i))
n 1

j 6=i
!
if zi ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) 6= 0,
xi;
 

 xi
n 1

j 6=i
 if zi ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = 0
& xi 2 Fi (xi; p) ,
x^i;
 

 x^i
n 1

j 6=i

otherwise,
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where fx^ig  @Fi (xi; p)\fyi 2 R`+j 9 2 R+ s.t. yi = xig, and z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i))
is specied in part (i.b) and in part (i.c) of MP-SH.
Rule 5: Otherwise, gi (m) = 
 and gj (m) = 0 for all j 6= i, where i is dened as
follows. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that 
1  1. Let
P
i2N yi1 = t.
Furthermore, it follows that, for all i, yi1 2 [0;
1]. Let v be an integer such that
v  t < v + 1. Therefore, t = v + s where s 2 [0; 1). It follows that there is a
unique agent i 2 N such that s 2  i 1
n
; i

n

.
According to the proposed construction,  is a natural price-quantity mechanism.
Note that in Rule 4, gi (m) = x^i holds whenever pi 2 @ and xi 2 QnFi (xi; p),
since (pi; xi) can never be a truthful message for any u0 2 UN if pi 2 @.
Thus, agent i can realize any element of @Fi (x
i; p) by a suitable choice of xi 2
QnFi (xi; p).
We shall show that F (u) = NA (;<u) for all u 2 UN and all H 2 H. Since
it is a routine exercise to prove that F (u)  NA (;<u) for any u and any H, we
shall omit the proof here. Conversely, for any (u;H) 2 UNH letm 2 NE (;<u)
for the given H. Since m cannot correspond to Rule 3, Rule 4, or Rule 5, m falls
either into Rule 1 or Rule 2.
Suppose that m falls into Rule 1. By Rule 4, we obtain that @Fi (x; p) 
gi (Mi;m i) for all i from which it follows that Fi (x; p)  L (xi; ui) for all i since
m 2 NE (;<u) and since agents utility functions are strictly monotonic. If
i 2 H, if mi =2 T i (u; F ) and if there exists m0i = (p0; x0i) 2 T i (u; F ) such that
gi (m
0
i;m i) 2 @L (xi; ui), then ((m0i;m i) ;m) 2ui . Since this contradicts the
assumption that m 2 NE (;<u) for the given H, gi (m0i;m i) =2 @L (xi; ui) for
all m0i 2 T i (u; F ) if i 2 H and mi =2 T i (u; F ). By the denition of function g,
it follows that zi

(p0; x0i) ; (p; xj)j2Nnfig

=2 @L (xi; ui) for all pairs (p0; x0i) which
are strongly truthful for u if i 2 H and mi =2 T i (u; F ). Therefore, part (ii) of
MP-SH implies that x 2 F (u). Since the case of m falling into Rule 2 can be
dealt similarly, we shall omit the proof here.
Since H 2 H and u 2 UN were chosen arbitrarily, the statement follows.
Proof of Lemma 1
We shall rst show that Wc (x; u) is non-empty and consists solely of constrained
Walrasian prices pWc for any u 2 U and any x 2 Wc (u). If u 2 U and if x 2 Wc (u),
there exists pWc 2  (x; u) such that pWc  xi = pWc  !i for all i. Since the domain
of Wc is U , there exists u0 2 U such that x 2 Wc (u0) and

pWc
	
=  (x; u0), in
which case u0 2 W 1c!
 
x; pWc

and pWc 2 Wc (x; u) by (1) and (2), respectively.
If (x; u) 2 Rn`+  U , if p 2  (x; u) is such that p  xi 6= p  !i for some i and
if fpg =  (x; u0) for some u0 2 U , then x 2 P (u0) nWc (u0), whence it follows
from (1) that u0 =2 W 1c! (x; p). Therefore, if (x; u) 2 Rn`+  U and if p 2  (x; u)
is such that p  xi 6= p  !i for some i, W 1c! (x; p) is an empty set, in which case
(2) implies that p =2 Wc (x; u). By denition (3), Wc (x; u) = Wc (x; u) for
any u 2 U and any x 2 Wc (u). For any tuple (u; x; p) 2 U Wc (u) Wc (x; u),
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the intersection set Wci (x; p) is \u02W 1c (x;p)L (xi; u0i) = fyi 2 Q j p  yi  p  !ig for
each i. If u 2 U and if Wci (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all i, it is plain that x 2 Wc (u)
with the equilibrium price p.
Proof of Lemma 2
We shall show only part (i) of the statement since part (ii) can be proved similarly.
Let p 2 , let ! 2 Rn`+ and let !p = (!pi )i2N 

p!i
p





i2N
. If (p; x) 2 Qn
is such that IW (p; x) = N and x =2 A, it follows from the denition of IW (p; x)
and the fact that U is the domain of W that W 1! (x
i; p) 6= ? for each i. Thus for
any i, ui (xii)  ui (!pi ) for all u 2 W 1! (xi; p). Moreover, given that IW (p; x) = N
and that agentsutility functions are strictly monotonic, it follows that p 0, so
that !pi 2 Wi (xi; p)\R`++ for all i. Let z (p; x)  !p. Therefore, by construction,
part (i) of P-WH is satised. If u 2 U and if Wi (xi; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui ) for all
i, then zi (p; x) 2 arg maxpyip!i uj (yi) for all i, so that z (p; x) 2 W (u). Since a
suitable denition of function Si (; (p; x i)) satisfying part (ii) of P-WH exists and
part (iii) of P-WH is vacuously satised, we conclude that W satises P-WH.
Proof of Lemma 3
We shall rst prove part (i) and then part (ii).
(i) Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, it can be shown that W (x; u) =
W (x; u) holds for any u 2 U and any x 2 W (u). Furthermore, x any tu-
ple (u; x; p) 2 U  W (u)  W (x; u). Then the intersection set Wi (x; p) is
\u02W 1(x;p)L (xi; u0i) = fyi 2 Q j p  yi  p  !ig for each i. Note that W (x; u) =
fpg since ` = 2. Fix an arbitrary u 2 U . Let Wi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all
i and let x =2 W (u). Then, x is a boundary point; moreover, x0j  
 if
x0j 2 arg maxpyjp!j uj (yj) for some j, in which case p cannot be paired with
any Walrasian allocation for u. Take any x 2 W (u) paired with the unique
equilibrium price pW . If xi = xi for some i, then p = p
W , which contradicts the
hypothesis that x 2 W (u). Thus xi 6= xi for all i. Since x 2 W (u) is arbitrary,
it follows that W satises M-WH.
(ii) For the sake of simplicity, let n = 3. Without loss of generality, let !i =
(1; 1; 1) for each i. Choose u 2 U such that a Walrasian equilibrium allocation at
u is x1 =
 
3; 1
2
; 1
2

, x2 =
 
0; 5
2
; 0

and x3 =
 
0; 0; 5
2

, with the equilibrium price
p =
 
1
5
; 2
5
; 2
5

. Let x 2 A be such that x1 =
 
5
2
; 0; 0

, x2 =
 
1
2
; 3; 1
2

and x3 = x3.
Furthermore, given our domain supposition, it is possible to choose a di¤erentiable
u 2 U such that the gradient vector of ui at xi for agent i is ru1 (x1) =
 
1
4
; 3
8
; 3
8

for agent 1, ru2 (x2) =
 
1
10
; 3
5
; 3
10

for agent 2 and ru3 (x3) =
 
1
10
; 3
10
; 3
5

for agent
3, while the gradient vector of ui at x

i is ru1 (x1) =
 
2
5
; 1
5
; 2
5

for agent 1 and
ru2 (x2) =
 
2
5
; 1
5
; 2
5

for agent 2. Note that ru3 (x3) = ru3 (x3) for agent 3 since
x3 = x

3. By construction, 
W
i (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all i and x 2 Wc (u) nW (u).
On the other hand, x 2 W (u) with the equilibrium price p =  2
5
; 1
5
; 2
5

. We
established that x 2 W (u) and x3 = x3, in violation of M-WH for H = f3g.
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Proof of Lemma 4
For any p 2  and ! 2 Rn`+ , dene !p as in the proof of Lemma 2. Dene the
real-valued function z of MP-SH as follows: For all (pj; xj)j2N 2 (Q)n, with
x  (xj)j2N ,
(a) if pj = p for each j, IW (p; x) = N , then z (p; x) = x if x 2 A, otherwise,
z (p; x) = !p;
(b) if pj = p for each j, and 1  IW (p; x)  n  1, then for each i:
zi (p; x) =
8><>:
!pi if i 2 S,
0 if i 2 IW (p; x) nS,

 Pj2S !pj
n jIW (p;x)j otherwise;
where the set S is dened as follows:
S =

i 2 IW (p; x) j (p; xi) is strongly truthful for some u0 2 U
	
(c) if for some i, pj = p for each j 2 Nn fig and pi 6= p, and if there exists
(u0; xi ) 2 U Q such that IW (p; x) = N , where x = (x i; xi ), and Wj (xj; p) 
L
 
zj (p; x
) ; u0j

for each j 2 N and if (pi; xi) is strongly truthful for some u0, then:
(c.1) if x 2 A, then z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = x;
(c.2) if x =2 A, then z ((pi; xi) ; (p; x i)) = !p;
(d) otherwise, z

(pj; xj)j2N

= 0.
By the above denition of function z, it is plain that part (i) of MP-SH is
satised. To show part (ii), take any (p; x) 2   Qn such that IW (p; x) = N .
Let u 2 U and let Wi (xi; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui ) for all i. If x =2 A, it follows from
the same reasoning used in the proof of Lemma 2 that z (p; x) = !p 2 W (u),
whence part (ii) of MP-SH is vacuously satised. Suppose that x 2 A, so that for
some u 2 U , x 2 W (u) with the equilibrium price p. Suppose that x =2 W (u).
First observe that x 2 Wc (u). We note also that x is a boundary point and
that x0j  
 if x0j 2 arg maxpyjp!j uj (yj) and xj =2 arg maxpyjp!j uj (yj) for
some j. Therefore, p cannot be paired with any Walrasian allocation for u, as
in the proof of part (i) of Lemma 3. Fix an arbitrary i. The pair (p; xi) is not
strongly truthful for u, which shows part (ii.a) ofMP-SH. Let (p0; x0i) be a strongly
truthful pair for u. By part (c.1) of the denition of function z, it follows that
zi ((p
0; x0i) ; (p; x i)) = xi. Since i is arbitrary, this shows thatW satisesMP-SH.
Proof of Lemma 6
We shall show only part (i) of the statement since part (ii) can be proved in the
same way.
Let n = 3, let ` = 2 and let 
 = (
1;
2) = (1; 1). Following Saijo et al. (1999;
proof of Lemma 1), suppose that each i announces (p; xi), with xi =

0;

2
2

.
Thus,
INP (p; x) = n and for each i, NPi (xi; p) is represented by the area of
the Figure 0AB plus the line BC (see Figure 1 below). Then, z (p; x) which
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satises part (i) of P-WH is such that for any i, zi (p; x) = (
1; 0) and zj (p; x) =
0;

2
2

for all j 6= i. Without loss of generality, let us focus on the case that
z (p; x) =

(
1; 0) ;

0;

2
2

;

0;

2
2

. Assume, to the contrary, that NP satises
P-WH. By Saijo et al. (1999; proof of Lemma 1), there exists u 2 U such that
z (p; x) =2 NP (u) and for any i, NPi (xi; p)  L (zi (p; x) ; ui ). Figure 1 illustrates
the economy u, where u1 induces the indi¤erence curve I

1 through A  (
1; 0),
represented by the lines AD and DE; u2 induces the indi¤erence curve I

2 through
C 

0;

2
2

, denoted by the line CK, which is orthogonal to p and parallel to
AB; u3 induces the indi¤erence curve I

3 through C =

0;

2
2

and F 


1
2
;

2
4

,
denoted by the lines CF and FG. Let u represent an economy with homothetic
preferences. It follows that I1 of u

1 at F =


1
2
;

2
4

is represented by HF and
FG. If x0 2 P (u), then x01 is always on the ray from the origin which passes
through D. Then, z (p; x) =2 NP (u). Consider x^  (x^1; x2; x^3) 2 A such that
x^1 = x^3 =


1
2
;

2
4

. Observe that x^ is Pareto superior to z (p; x) at u and that
x^ 2 NP (u) with p 2 NP (x^; u). We established that x2 is weakly truthful for
u, in violation of part (iii.a) of P-WH for H = f2g.
Figure 1: NP violates P-WH and MP-SH
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Proof of Lemma 7
Fix any u 2 U such that ui is strictly concave and di¤erentiable for each i. Let x 2
EE (u) \ Rn`++. Then fpg = EE (x; u), from which EEi (x; p) can be constructed
for each i. If u0 2 EE 1 (x; p), then for some u0 2 (0; 1), u0i (xi) = u0i

u
0



for
each i. Therefore, u
0

 2 @L (xi; u0i) for each i if u0 2 EE 1 (x; p). Dene (x;p)
as (x;p)  minu02EE 1(x;p) u0 . It follows that (x;p)
 2 @EEi (x; p) for each i and
that is intersection set EEi (x; p) has the following property: For each i, there is a
neighborhood B (xi)  @EEi (x; p) of xi such that for any yi 2 B (xi), p yi = p xi.
Let u 2 U be such that ui is strictly concave and di¤erentiable for each i and
let EEi (x; p)  L (xi; ui ) for all i. Fix any two distinct agents j; k 2 N . Suppose
that for j and k and for some  > 0 it holds that uj (xj + (;0)) = u

j (

)
and uk (xk   (;0)) = uk (
) for some  > (x;p), and it holds that the gradient
vector of uj at (xj + (;0)) and the gradient vector of u

k at (xj   (;0)) are equal to
p: That is, ruj (xj + (;0)) = ruk (xk   (;0)) = p, where 0 2 R` 1+ is the ` 1-th
dimensional zero vector. Let ui (xi) = u

i (

) for each i 6= j; k. By construction
and the supposition that u 2 U , it follows that there exist j and k such that
(x;p) < j <  < k, uj (xj) = u

j
 
j


and uk (xk) = u

k
 
k


. Then, x 2
P (u) nEE (u) and x 2 EE (u), where xj = (xj + (;0)), xk = (xk   (;0)),
and xi = xi for each i 6= j; k. Since EE is essentially single-valued and since each
ui is strictly concave,
19 fxg = EE (u). Moreover, p 2 EE (x; u). It follows
that for each i 6= j; k, xi is weakly truthful for u and (p; xi) is strongly truthful
for u, in violation of M-WH and MP-SH for i 6= j; k.
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